

Risk Aversion, Insurance Propensity, and Risk Measures

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
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Wuhan University, China, October 2023

Content



- ▶ **Maccheroni/Marinacci/W./Wu**
Risk aversion and insurance propensity

arXiv: 2310.09173, 2023

- ▶ **Han/Wang/W./Wu**
Risk concentration and the mean-Expected Shortfall criterion

Mathematical Finance, 2023

- ▶ **Bellini/Mao/W./Wu**
Duet expectile preferences

Working paper, 2023

Agenda

- 1 Background
- 2 Insurance propensity
- 3 Risk-insurance equivalence
- 4 Choice under dependence
- 5 Risk measures
- 6 Conclusion

Risk aversion

Risk aversion

- ▶ Probability and gambling e.g., [Bernoulli 1738](#) ['54 ECMA]
- ▶ Finance e.g., [Markowitz'52](#) JF; [Merton'73](#) ECMA
- ▶ Insurance e.g., [Arrow'63](#) AER
- ▶ Economics e.g., [Pratt'64](#) ECMA
- ▶ Psychology e.g., [Kahneman/Tversky'79](#) ECMA
- ▶ Experimental observations e.g., [Holt/Larry'02](#) AER

What is risk aversion?

Let \succsim be a preference relation over random payoffs on (S, Σ, P)

- ▶ Arrow'63; Pratt'64

Weak risk aversion

$$\mathbb{E}(f) \succsim f$$

- ▶ Rothschild/Stiglitz'70

Strong risk aversion

$$f \succeq_{cv} g \implies f \succsim g$$

- ▶ $f \succeq_{cv} g$ means $\mathbb{E}(\varphi \circ f) \geq \mathbb{E}(\varphi \circ g)$ for all concave φ

What is risk aversion?

- ▶ The **expected utility (EU)** theory von Neumann/Morgenstern'44

$$f \succsim g \iff \int u \circ f dP \geq \int u \circ g dP$$

for an increasing $u : \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$

- ▶ In the EU framework

concavity of u \iff strong risk aversion \iff weak risk aversion

What is risk aversion?

- ▶ The **dual utility (DU)** theory (Choquet integral) **Yaari'87 ECMA**

$$f \succsim g \iff \int f d(\phi \circ P) \geq \int g d(\phi \circ P)$$

for an increasing $\phi : [0, 1] \rightarrow [0, 1]$ with $\phi(0) = 0$ and $\phi(1) = 1$


- ▶ In the DU framework

convexity of ϕ \iff strong risk aversion

$\phi \leq$ identity \iff weak risk aversion

- ▶ Generally: strong \implies weak; the converse is not true

What is risk aversion?



Insurance propensity

Insurance propensity

A merchant is about to ship commodities with a vessel

- ▶ The merchant earns $a > 0$ if the vessel reaches destination (state ω_1), otherwise (state ω_2) loses $b > 0$



- ▶ The uncertain wealth of the merchant is denoted by

$$w = (a, -b)$$

- ▶ Assume that ω_1 and ω_2 are known to be equally likely

Insurance propensity

- ▶ Let $c, d > 0$. An insurance against the shipping failure

$$f = (-c, d)$$

- ▶ Another act g with $g \stackrel{d}{=} f$ is

$$g = (d, -c)$$

(a gamble on the shipping success)

- ▶ A choice seems natural:

$$w + \underset{\text{insurance}}{f} \succsim w + g$$

- ▶ Can this say anything about the risk attitude?

Insurance propensity

Basic framework

- ▶ (S, Σ, P) : probability space, **nonatomic** or **uniform** on finite S
- ▶ \mathcal{F} : all Σ -measurable bounded real-valued functions
 - All results work also on the set \mathcal{M}^∞ of all measurable functions with all finite moments (e.g., normal)
- ▶ Two random payoffs f and g are **equally distributed**, written $f \stackrel{d}{=} g$, if $P \circ f^{-1} = P \circ g^{-1}$
- ▶ A binary relation \succsim on \mathcal{F} is a **risk preference** when it is a preorder such that

$$f \stackrel{d}{=} g \implies f \sim g$$

Classic notions of risk attitude

A preference \succsim is

- (i) **strongly risk averse** if, for all $f, g \in \mathcal{F}$, $f \succeq_{cv} g \implies f \succsim g$;
- (ii) **strongly risk propense** if, for all $f, g \in \mathcal{F}$, $f \succeq_{cv} g \implies g \succsim f$;
- (iii) **risk neutral** if, for all $f \in \mathcal{F}$, $\mathbb{E}(f) \sim f$;
- (iv) **weakly risk averse** if, for all $f \in \mathcal{F}$, $\mathbb{E}(f) \succsim f$;
- (v) **weakly risk propense** if, for all $f \in \mathcal{F}$, $f \succsim \mathbb{E}(f)$.

Risk neutrality \iff strong risk aversion + strong risk propension
(also holds for the weak versions)

Insurance propensity

Given any initial wealth w , a random payoff f is:

- (i) a **full insurance** for w , written $f \in \mathcal{I}^{\text{fi}}(w)$, when

$$f = -w - \pi$$

for some premium $\pi \in \mathbb{R}$;

- (ii) a **proportional insurance** for w , written $f \in \mathcal{I}^{\text{pr}}(w)$, when

$$f = -(1 - \varepsilon)w - \pi$$

for some premium $\pi \in \mathbb{R}$ and percentage excess $\varepsilon \in [0, 1)$;

- (iii) a **deductible-limit insurance** for w , written $f \in \mathcal{I}^{\text{dl}}(w)$, when

$$f = (-w - \delta)^+ \wedge \lambda - \pi$$

for some premium $\pi \in \mathbb{R}$, deductible $\delta \in \mathbb{R}$ and limit $\lambda \geq 0$.

Insurance propensity

$$\mathcal{I}^{\text{fi}}(w) = \mathcal{I}^{\text{Pr}}(w) \cap \mathcal{I}^{\text{dl}}(w)$$




Figure: Proportional insurance (in red) and deductible-limit insurance (in blue) for loss $-w$

Insurance propensity

A risk preference \succsim is:

- (i) **propense to full insurance** when, for all $w, f, g \in \mathcal{F}$ with $g \stackrel{d}{=} f$,

$$f \in \mathcal{I}^{\text{fi}}(w) \implies w + f \succsim w + g;$$

- (ii) **propense to proportional insurance** when, for all $w, f, g \in \mathcal{F}$ with $g \stackrel{d}{=} f$,

$$f \in \mathcal{I}^{\text{pr}}(w) \implies w + f \succsim w + g;$$

- (iii) **propense to deductible-limit insurance** when, for all $w, f, g \in \mathcal{F}$ with $g \stackrel{d}{=} f$,

$$f \in \mathcal{I}^{\text{dl}}(w) \implies w + f \succsim w + g.$$

Risk-insurance equivalence

Risk-insurance equivalence

Propension to full insurance:

$$-\pi = w + f \succsim w + g \text{ where } g \stackrel{d}{=} f = -w - \pi$$

Theorem 1

The following properties are equivalent for a risk preference:

- (i) *weak risk aversion;*
- (ii) *propension to full insurance.*

- ▶ (i) \Rightarrow (ii) is simple
- ▶ To show (ii) \Rightarrow (i), one needs to show $\mathbb{E}(f) \succsim f$ for all f from $-\pi \succsim w + g$ for all $g \stackrel{d}{=} -w - \pi$
- ▶ For each f , need to find $g' \stackrel{d}{=} g - \mathbb{E}(f)$ such that $f \stackrel{d}{=} g - g'$

A key step to prove Theorem 1

Denote the essential supremum and the essential infimum of f by

$$u_f = \inf \{x \in \mathbb{R} : P(f \geq x) \geq 1\}, \quad l_f = \inf \{x \in \mathbb{R} : P(f \geq x) > 0\}$$

Theorem 2

Let $k \geq 1$ and $f \in L^k$. Then $\mathbb{E}(f) = 0$ if and only if there exist $g, g' \in L^{k-1}$ such that $g \stackrel{d}{=} g'$ and $g - g' \stackrel{d}{=} f$. If, in addition, $f \in L^\infty$, then we can take $g, g' \in L^\infty$ satisfying $l_f \leq g, g' \leq u_f$.

Simple version: For $f \in L^\infty$,

$$\mathbb{E}(f) = 0 \iff f \stackrel{d}{=} g - g' \text{ for some } g, g' \in L^\infty \text{ with } g \stackrel{d}{=} g'$$

Some mathematics

Proof sketch. \Leftarrow :

- ▶ Use this

The Annals of Probability
1977, Vol. 5, No. 1, 157-158

AN UNEXPECTED EXPECTATION

BY GORDON SIMONS¹

University of North Carolina

It is shown that, while the value of the expectation $E(X + Y)$ always depends on the random variables X and Y only through their marginal distributions, the same kind of statement cannot be made for $E(X + Y + Z)$.

- ▶ $\mathbb{E}(f) = \mathbb{E}(g - g') = \mathbb{E}(g - g^*)$ for $g^* \stackrel{d}{=} g'$
- ▶ Take $g^* = g$

Some mathematics

Proof sketch (continued). \Rightarrow : for a finite uniform space:

- ▶ Let f have mean 0 and write $x_i = f(\omega_i)$

	ω_1	ω_2	\cdots	ω_{n-1}	ω_n
f	x_1	x_2	\cdots	x_{n-1}	x_n
g	x_1	$x_1 + x_2$	\cdots	$\sum_{i=1}^{n-1} x_i$	$\sum_{i=1}^n x_i$
g'	0	x_1	\cdots	$\sum_{i=1}^{n-2} x_i$	$\sum_{i=1}^{n-1} x_i$

- ▶ $\sum_{i=1}^n x_i = 0$
- ▶ The range statement can be shown by rearranging ω
- ▶ In the general case, g has one less moment than f

Expected utility

Example (EU).

- ▶ Suppose that \succsim is EU with (measurable) utility function u
- ▶ Take $a \in \mathbb{R}$, $b > 0$ and two events with probability $1/2$ each
- ▶ Let $w = (a, a + b)$, $f = (a, a - b)$ and $g = (a - b, a)$
- ▶ f is full insurance for w ; $f \stackrel{d}{=} g$
- ▶ Propension to full insurance implies

$$\mathbb{E}[u(w + f)] \geq \mathbb{E}[u(w + g)]$$

which is

$$u(2a) \geq \frac{1}{2}u(2a - b) + \frac{1}{2}u(2a + b)$$

- ▶ Since a, b are arbitrary this implies concavity of u
- ▶ \succsim is risk averse

Risk-insurance equivalence

Theorem 3

The following properties are equivalent for a continuous risk preference:

- (i) strong risk aversion;*
- (ii) propensity to proportional insurance;*
- (iii) propensity to deductible-limit insurance.*

▶ (i) \Rightarrow (ii) and (iii) in the literature

Lorentz'53 AMM

see Tchen'80 AOP; Rüschemdorf'80 PTRF; Puccetti/W.'15 STS

More insurances

Given any initial wealth w , a random payoff f is:

- (iv) an **indemnity-schedule insurance** for w , written $f \in \mathcal{I}^{\text{is}}(w)$,
when

$$f = I(-w)$$

for some real-valued (weakly) increasing map I ;

- (v) a **contingency-schedule insurance** for w , written $f \in \mathcal{I}^{\text{cs}}(w)$,
when

$$-w(s) > -w(s') \implies f(s) \geq f(s')$$

for almost all states s and s' . counter-monotonicity

Relation

$$\mathcal{I}^{\text{pr}}(w) \cup \mathcal{I}^{\text{dl}}(w) \subset \mathcal{I}^{\text{is}}(w) \subset \mathcal{I}^{\text{cs}}(w)$$

More insurances

- (vi) Given any initial wealth w , a random payoff f is a **better hedge** for w than a random payoff g , written $f \succeq_w g$, when $f \stackrel{d}{=} g$ and

$$P(f \leq t; w \leq l) \leq P(g \leq t; w \leq l)$$

for all payouts $t \in \mathbb{R}$ and wealth levels $l \in \mathbb{R}$.

- Copulas are ordered
- Equivalent condition:

$$P(f \leq t \mid w \leq l) \leq P(g \leq t \mid w \leq l)$$

More insurances

A risk preference \succsim is:

(iv) **propense to indemnity-schedule insurance** when, for all $w, f, g \in \mathcal{F}$ with $g \stackrel{d}{=} f$,

$$f \in \mathcal{I}^{\text{is}}(w) \implies w + f \succsim w + g;$$

(v) **propense to contingency-schedule insurance** when, for all $w, f, g \in \mathcal{F}$ with $g \stackrel{d}{=} f$,

$$f \in \mathcal{I}^{\text{cs}}(w) \implies w + f \succsim w + g;$$

(vi) **propense to hedging** when, for all $w, f, g \in \mathcal{F}$ with $g \stackrel{d}{=} f$,

$$f \succeq_w g \implies w + f \succsim w + g.$$

More insurances

Theorem 4

The following conditions are equivalent for a continuous risk preference:

- (i) strong risk aversion;*
- (ii) propensity to proportional insurance;*
- (iii) propensity to deductible-limit insurance;*
- (iv) propensity to indemnity-schedule insurance;*
- (v) propensity to contingency-schedule insurance;*
- (vi) propensity to hedging.*

Comparative attitudes

A risk preference \succsim is **secular** when, for all $f, g \in \mathcal{F}$, there exists $\rho \in \mathbb{R}$, denoted by $\rho(f, g)$, such that

$$g \sim f - \rho$$

- ▶ Consider two agents Ann (A) and Bob (B) with ρ_A and ρ_B
- ▶ B is **weakly more risk averse than** A when Yaari'69 JET

$$f = \mathbb{E}[g] \implies \rho_B(g, f) \geq \rho_A(g, f)$$

- ▶ B is **strongly more risk averse than** A when Ross'81 ECMA

$$f \geq_{cv} g \implies \rho_B(g, f) \geq \rho_A(g, f)$$

Comparative attitudes

Let \succsim_A and \succsim_B be monotone and secular risk preferences

- ▶ B is **more prone to full insurance than** A when, for all $w, f, g \in \mathcal{F}$ with $g \stackrel{d}{=} f$,

$$f \in \mathcal{I}^{\text{fi}}(w) \implies \rho_B(w + g, w + f) \geq \rho_A(w + g, w + f)$$

- ▶ **Partial insurance:** \mathcal{I}^{fi} is replaced by other sets of insurance
- ▶ B is **more prone to hedging than** A when, for all $w, f, g \in \mathcal{F}$ with $g \stackrel{d}{=} f$,

$$f \succeq_w g \implies \rho_B(w + g, w + f) \geq \rho_A(w + g, w + f)$$

Summary

ABSOLUTE ATTITUDES




Figure: Summary of absolute attitudes, where superscript pi is any one of dl, pr, is, cs

Summary

COMPARATIVE ATTITUDES




Figure: Summary of comparative attitudes, where superscript pi is any one of dl, pr, is, cs

Choice under dependence

Choice under dependence

Definition 1

Two acts f and g are **comonotonic**, written $f // g$, when

$$(f(s) - f(s')) (g(s) - g(s')) \geq 0$$

for all states s and s' . When \leq is in place of \geq , we say that the two acts are **counter-monotonic**, written $f \backslash\backslash g$.

- ▶ Comonotonicity \implies no hedge
- ▶ Counter-monotonicity \implies maximum hedge

Choice under dependence

A set $\mathcal{D} \subseteq \mathcal{F}^2$ is **dependence shell** if it satisfies

$$(f, g) \in \mathcal{D} \text{ and } (f', g') \stackrel{d}{=} (f, g) \implies (f', g') \in \mathcal{D}$$

- ▶ \mathcal{D} describes a binary relation on joint distributions
- ▶ \mathcal{D} is **rich** if for any (f, h) , there exists g such that $f \stackrel{d}{=} g$ and $(g, h) \in \mathcal{D}$

The following dependence shells are rich:

- (i) $\mathcal{D}_{\text{CM}} = \{(f, g) \in \mathcal{F}^2 : f // g\}$ (comonotonicity)
- (ii) $\mathcal{D}_{\text{CT}} = \{(f, g) \in \mathcal{F}^2 : f \backslash\backslash g\}$ (counter-comonotonicity)
- (iii) $\mathcal{D}_{\text{AL}} = \mathcal{F}^2$ (all)

Choice under dependence

Richness depends on the probability space:¹

(iv) $\mathcal{D}_{\text{IN}} = \{(f, g) \in \mathcal{F}^2 : f \perp g\}$ (independence)

Not rich:

(v) $\mathcal{D}_{\text{PL}} = \{(f, g) \in \mathcal{F}^2 : f = ag + b \text{ for some } a > 0 \text{ and } b \in \mathbb{R}\}$
(positive linear dependence)

(vi) $\mathcal{D}_{\text{NL}} = \{(f, g) \in \mathcal{F}^2 : f = ag + b \text{ for some } a < 0 \text{ and } b \in \mathbb{R}\}$
(negative linear dependence)

(vii) $\mathcal{D}_{\text{CS}} = \{(f, g) \in \mathcal{F}^2 : f + g = \mathbb{E}(f + g)\}$ (constant sum)

- \mathcal{D}_{CS} is also called JM dependence Wang/W.'16 MOR

¹In an atomless probability space, richness of \mathcal{D}_{IN} means that for all $f \in \mathcal{F}$ there exists a continuously distributed random variable independent of f

Choice under dependence

Definition 2

Let \mathcal{D} be a dependence shell. A preference \succsim is **\mathcal{D} -averse** if for all acts f, g, w ,

$$f \stackrel{d}{=} g \text{ and } (g, w) \in \mathcal{D} \implies w + f \succsim w + g.$$

A preference \succsim is **\mathcal{D} -propense** if for all acts f, g, w ,

$$f \stackrel{d}{=} g \text{ and } (f, w) \in \mathcal{D} \implies w + f \succsim w + g.$$

A preference \succsim is **\mathcal{D} -neutral** if it is both \mathcal{D} -averse and \mathcal{D} -propense.

- ▶ Example: propensity to full insurance is \mathcal{D}_{CS} -propension

Characterizing risk neutrality

\mathcal{D}_{AL} -neutrality:

$$f \stackrel{d}{=} g \implies w + f \sim w + g.$$

Theorem 5

For a binary transitive relation \succsim , the following are equivalent:

- (i) \succsim satisfies \mathcal{D}_{AL} -neutrality;
- (ii) \succsim is risk neutral.

- ▶ A fundamental connection between risk attitude and dependence

Some mathematics

Proof of Theorem 5.

- ▶ Taking $w = 0$ yields

$$f \stackrel{d}{=} g \implies f \sim g$$

- ▶ For any $f \in L^1$, by Theorem 2,

$$f \stackrel{d}{=} g - g' + \mathbb{E}(f) \sim g - g + \mathbb{E}(f) = \mathbb{E}(f)$$

- ▶ $f \sim \mathbb{E}(f)$

Another equivalence

Proposition 1

Let $\mathcal{F} = \mathcal{M}^\infty$ and P be nonatomic. The following conditions are equivalent for a monotone risk preference \succsim :

(i) for all $f, g \in \mathcal{F}$, $f \succsim g \iff \mathbb{E}[f] \geq \mathbb{E}[g]$;

(ii) for all $w, f, g \in \mathcal{F}$, (this paper)

$$f \succeq_{\text{fsd}} g \implies w + f \succsim w + g;$$

(iii) for all $w, f, g \in \mathcal{F}$, (de Finetti'31)

$$f \succsim g \implies w + f \succsim w + g;$$

(iv) \succsim is complete and (Pomatto/Strack/Tamuz'20 JPE)

$$f \succ g \implies w + f \succ_{\text{fsd}} w + g$$

for some $w \in \mathcal{F}$ independent of both f and g (if possible).

Choice under dependence and risk aversion

Theorem 6

For a continuous risk preference \succsim , the following conditions are equivalent.

- (i) \succsim is \mathcal{D}_{CT} -propense;
- (ii) \succsim is \mathcal{D}_{CM} -averse;
- (iii) \succsim is \mathcal{D}_{NL} -propense;
- (iv) \succsim is \mathcal{D}_{PL} -averse;
- (v) \succsim is strongly risk averse.

Choice under dependence and risk aversion

Example (EU).

- ▶ Suppose that \succsim is EU with (measurable) utility function u
- ▶ Take $a \in \mathbb{R}$, $b > 0$ and two events with probability $1/2$ each
- ▶ Let $w = (a, a + b)$, $f = (a, a - b)$ and $g = (a - b, a)$
- ▶ $f \stackrel{d}{=} g$; f, w counter-monotonic; g, w comonotonic
- ▶ either \mathcal{D}_{CT} -propension or \mathcal{D}_{CM} -aversion implies

$$\mathbb{E}[u(w + f)] \geq \mathbb{E}[u(w + g)]$$

which is

$$u(2a) \geq \frac{1}{2}u(2a - b) + \frac{1}{2}u(2a + b)$$

- ▶ Since a, b are arbitrary this implies concavity of u
- ▶ \succsim is strongly risk averse

Choice under dependence and risk aversion

Risk aversion $\implies \mathcal{D}_{\text{CM-aversion}}/\mathcal{D}_{\text{CT-propension}}$ (classic)

see Tchen'80 AOP; Rüschemdorf'80 PTRF; Puccetti/W.'15 STS

Reverse direction (more important for us):

Ceteris paribus, risk aversion can be inferred by,

- ★ a demand for insurance, or
- ★ a dislike of gambling


The chain

$$\mathcal{D}_{\text{CS}} \subseteq \mathcal{D}_{\text{CT}} \subseteq \mathcal{D}_{\text{AL}}$$

corresponds to the following chain

weak risk aversion \longleftarrow strong risk aversion \longleftarrow risk neutrality

Is Antonio risk averse?



ACT 1, SCENE 1

ANTONIO:

*Believe me, no. I thank my fortune for it,
My ventures are **not in one bottom** trusted,
Nor to one place; nor is my whole estate
Upon the fortune of this present year:
Therefore my merchandise makes me not sad.*

(in response to SALARINO and SOLANIO)

⇒ This is a **choice under dependence**

Is Antonio risk averse?

- ▶ Suppose that Antonio has two sets of commodities to deliver
- ▶ The first has payoff h
- ▶ The second has payoff f if it is on another boat
- ▶ The second has payoff g if it is on the same boat
- ▶ Two boats have the same subjective probability to return
- ▶ $f \stackrel{d}{=} g$ and g, h comonotonic



Antonio says that commodities
not in one boat makes him not sad

⇒ in one boat makes him sad

⇒ $h + f \succcurlyeq h + g$

⇒ Antonio is risk averse!

Is Antonio risk averse?



- ▶ Later Antonio takes a gamble with Shylock, but there was **no comparable alternative** presented \implies not a choice under dependence

ACT 1, SCENE 3

ANTONIO: *Come on: in this there can be no dismay;*

My ships come home a month before the day.

Risk measures


Risk measures

- ▶ Fix an atomless probability space (S, Σ, \mathbb{P})
- ▶ \mathcal{X} : the space of bounded random variables, representing losses
- ▶ A preference \succsim is represented by a **risk measure** $\rho : \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$

$$X \succsim Y \iff \rho(X) \leq \rho(Y)$$

- ▶ $\rho(X)$ is the amount of regulatory capital for a risk model X

VaR and ES



Value-at-Risk (VaR), $p \in (0, 1)$

$$\text{VaR}_p : L^0 \rightarrow \mathbb{R},$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{VaR}_p(X) &= F_X^{-1}(p) \\ &= \inf\{x \in \mathbb{R} : \mathbb{P}(X \leq x) \geq p\}. \end{aligned}$$

(left-quantile)

Expected Shortfall (ES), $p \in (0, 1)$

$$\text{ES}_p : L^1 \rightarrow \mathbb{R},$$

$$\text{ES}_p(X) = \frac{1}{1-p} \int_p^1 \text{VaR}_q(X) dq$$

(also: TVaR/CVaR/AVaR)

Some recent work on VaR and ES

▶ Axiomatic characterizations

- VaR: Kou/Peng' 16 OR; He/Peng' 18 OR; Liu/W.'21 MOR
- ES: W./Zitikis'21 MS; Embrechts/Mao/Wang/W.'21 MF

▶ Risk sharing

- Embrechts/Liu/W.'18 OR; Embrechts/Liu/Mao/W.'20 MP

▶ Robustness

- Embrechts/Wang/W.15 FS; Embrechts/Schied/W.'22 OR

▶ Calibrating levels between VaR and ES

- Li/W.'23 JE

▶ Forecasting and backtesting

- Fissler/Ziegel'16 AOS; Nolde/Ziegel'17 AOAS;
Du/Escanciano'17 MS

Basic axioms

Basic axioms

- M.** (**Monotonicity**) $\rho(X) \leq \rho(Y)$ whenever $X \leq Y$.
- TI.** (**Translation invariance**) $\rho(X + m) = \rho(X) + m$ for $X \in \mathcal{X}$ and $m \in \mathbb{R}$.
- PH.** (**Positive homogeneity**) $\rho(\lambda X) = \lambda\rho(X)$ for $X \in \mathcal{X}$ and $\lambda > 0$.
- LI.** (**Law-invariance**) $\rho(X) = \rho(Y)$ whenever $X \stackrel{d}{=} Y$.
- P.** (**Prudence**) $\liminf_n \rho(\xi_n) \geq \rho(X)$ whenever $\xi_n \rightarrow X$.

- ▶ **M** and **TI**: **monetary** risk measures Föllmer/Schied'02 FS
- ▶ **P**: the loss is modeled truthfully (e.g., consistent estimators)
⇒ **estimated risk** \geq **true risk** asymptotically W./Zitikis'21 MS
- ▶ For $p \in (0, 1)$, both ES_p and VaR_p satisfy all above

Choice under dependence

Choice under dependence (\mathcal{D} -aversion):

$$X + Y \succsim X + Z, \quad \text{with } Y \stackrel{d}{=} Z$$

or, equivalently $\rho(X + Y) \leq \rho(X + Z), \quad \text{with } Y \stackrel{d}{=} Z$

for (X, Z) in some dependence shell \mathcal{D} (**undesirable**)

How do we formulate **undesirable dependence** for portfolio risks?

- ▶ **No condition** on dependence \implies the **mean** Theorem 5
- ▶ **Comonotonicity** \implies risk aversion Theorem 6; Mao/W.'20 SIFIN
- ▶ Something **less restrictive** than comonotonicity?

Concentrated risks


Definition 3 (Tail events)

A **tail event** of X is $A \in \Sigma$ such that


- a) $0 < \mathbb{P}(A) < 1$
- b) $X(\omega) \geq X(\omega')$
for a.e. all $\omega \in A$ and $\omega' \in A^c$

Undesirable dependence

concentrated portfolio \iff
severe losses occur **simultaneously**
on a stress event specified by the
regulator




Risk concentration in 2009



S&P 500, NASDAQ and Dow Jones daily returns, Jan 2, 2009 - Dec 31, 2009

Risk concentration in 2019 - 2020



S&P 500, NASDAQ and Dow Jones daily returns, Jul 1, 2019 - Jun 30, 2020

Choice under dependence and ES

Concentration aversion

CA. (**Concentration aversion**) There exists an event $A \in \Sigma$ with $\mathbb{P}(A) \in (0, 1)$ such that $\rho(X + Y) \leq \rho(X + Z)$ if $Y \stackrel{d}{=} Z$ and X and Z share the tail event A .

(non-concentrated) $X + Y \succsim X + Z$ (concentrated) with $Y \stackrel{d}{=} Z$

Theorem 7 (Han/Wang/W./Wu'23 MF)

A functional $\rho : \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ with $\rho(0) = 0$ satisfies Axioms **M**, **LI**, **TI**, **P** and **CA** if and only if it is ES_p for some $p \in (0, 1)$.

► ρ satisfies **M**, **LI** and **CA** $\iff \rho = f(\text{ES}_p, \mathbb{E})$ for increasing f

Expectiles

For $\alpha \in (0, 1)$ and $X \in \mathcal{X}$, the α -**expectile** $e_\alpha(X)$ is the unique number y such that

$$\alpha \mathbb{E} [(X - y)_+] = (1 - \alpha) \mathbb{E} [(y - X)_+]$$

Expectiles are

- ▶ introduced in asymmetric least squares Newey/Powell'87 ECMA


$$e_\alpha(X) = \arg \min_{y \in \mathbb{R}} \mathbb{E} [\alpha(X - y)_+^2 + (1 - \alpha)(y - X)_+^2]$$

- ▶ coherent if $\alpha \geq 1/2$ Bellini/Klar/Müller/Rosazza Gianin'14 IME
- ▶ elicitable Ziegel'16 MF
- ▶ the mean if $\alpha = 1/2$

The risk measures diagram

Ch. (Choquet) **M** + **LI** + **TI** + comonotonic additivity

Co. (Coherence) **M** + **LI** + **TI** + convexity + **PH**



Choice under dependence and expectiles

Co-losses

Random variables X and Z are **co-losses** if $\{X > 0\} = \{Z > 0\}$.

Co-loss dependence aversion

CLA. (**Co-loss aversion**) $\rho(X + Y) \leq \rho(X + Z)$ if $Y \stackrel{d}{=} Z \sim 0$,
and X and Z are co-losses.

(no co-loss) $X + Y \succsim X + Z$ (**co-loss**) with $Y \stackrel{d}{=} Z \sim 0$

Theorem 8 (Bellini/Mao/W./Wu'23)

A functional $\rho : \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ with $\rho(0) = 0$ satisfies Axioms **M**, **TI**, **PH**
and **CLA** if and only if it is e_α for some $\alpha \in [1/2, 1)$.

Conclusion

Choices under dependence

- ▶ characterizes and explains
 - **risk neutrality**: \mathcal{D}_{AL} -propension/aversion/neutrality
 - **weak risk aversion**: \mathcal{D}_{CS} -propension
 - **strong risk aversion**: \mathcal{D}_{CT} -propension/ \mathcal{D}_{CM} -aversion
- ▶ characterizes risk measures
 - **arbitrary** dependence: **mean**
 - **concentration** via tail events: **ES**
 - **co-loss** dependence: **expectiles**
- ▶ can be used to infer risk attitudes
- ▶ leads to new mathematics

Conclusion

Future directions on choice under dependence

- ▶ Other dependence concepts lead to **different risk measures**
 - VaR?
- ▶ Ambiguity preferences; multidimensional (systemic) risks
 - What is a **notion of comparability** similar to $\stackrel{d}{=}$ for ambiguity?
- ▶ Can we model **more delicate** risk attitudes?
 - higher order, fractional order, loss aversion, wealth effect, ...
- ▶ How can we **quantitatively** infer risk aversion from observed portfolio strategies?
- ▶ What **new notions** of risk attitudes and risk measures can come out of this new framework?

Thank you

Thank you for your attention



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