

Dependence in Stochastic Modeling: Financial Crisis, Strategies, Equilibria, Decisions, Transport, and Statistics

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
Alibaba Mathematics Colloquium, September 1, 2021

Agenda

- 1 Background
- 2 Financial crisis
- 3 Equilibria and strategies
- 4 Decision theory
- 5 Mass transport
- 6 Statistics
- 7 E-values and selective inference

Background

Quantitative Risk Management



Background

The University of Waterloo

- ▶ A young tech university
- ▶ One of the largest research groups in Actuarial Science/Quantitative Finance/Risk Management in the world with ≈ 20 professors
- ▶ No.1 in Actuarial Science Research worldwide by UNL ranking
- ▶ Largest Mathematics Faculty, > 8000 students, > 240 professors

For this talk, I assume

- ▶ Basic college probability theory
- ▶ Basic college statistics
- ▶ Good understanding in mathematics

A general setup

A random vector $\mathbf{X} = (X_1, \dots, X_n)$

Assumptions

marginals **may be known**; dependence is **unknown/arbitrary**

Questions:


- ▶ properties of $\Psi(\mathbf{X})$ for some $\Psi : \mathbb{R}^n \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^d$
- ▶ range of $\mathbb{P}(\mathbf{X} \in A)$ for some $A \subseteq \mathbb{R}^n$
- ▶ “optimal” dependence structures of \mathbf{X}
- ▶ statistical decisions based on \mathbf{X}

Dates back to **Fréchet-Hoeffding**; has roots in **Monge-Kantorovich**

- ▶ Data scarcity; uncertainty; optimization variable; absent information; lack of models; equilibrium output




An innocent question

What is a possible distribution of $S = X_1 + X_2$ for uniformly distributed X_1 and X_2 ?



Obvious constraints

- ▶ $\mathbb{E}[S] = 0$
- ▶ range of $S \subseteq [-2, 2]$
- ▶ $\text{Var}(S) \leq 4/3$



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Financial crisis

The 2007 - 09 **financial crisis**:

- ▶ **the worst** one since the **Great Depression** of the 1930s
- ▶ **once in 50 years** event
- ▶ **subprime** mortgage bubble
- ▶ Key ingredients
 - a housing market at peak (2006)
 - structured financial products and derivatives
 - **collateralized debt obligations** (CDO)
 - **credit default swaps** (CDS)
 - advanced mathematical models
 - political shortsightedness and the slow reaction of regulators

CDO

A **CDO** repackages the cash flows from a set of assets

- ▶ Pooling the return from a set of assets (e.g. **loans**)
- ▶ Claims are **tranching**: differing priorities
- ▶ Creates new securities, of which **some are less risky than the original assets**, and **others are riskier**.


“**The engine that powered the mortgage supply chain**” for nonprime mortgages

- ▶ Sales of CDOs grew from **\$69B in 2000** to around **\$500B in 2006**
- ▶ Between 2003 and 2007, Wall Street issued almost **\$700B** in CDOs that included mortgage-backed securities as collateral

CDO: An example

- ▶ $X_i \geq 0$ is the **random loss** from a **defaultable, speculative-grade bond** i , $i = 1, \dots, n$
- ▶ X_1, \dots, X_n standalone are **not very attractive** to investors
- ▶ The idea of CDO
 - Pool X_1, \dots, X_n : let $L = \sum_{i=1}^n X_i$ and take some constants $K_1 < K_2$
 - **Design financial products** with payments Y_1, Y_2, Y_3 so that
 - $Y_1 = (L - K_2)_+$
 - $Y_2 = \min\{(L - K_1)_+, K_2 - K_1\}$
 - $Y_3 = \min\{L, K_1\}$
 - $Y_1 + Y_2 + Y_3 = L$
 - $\mathbb{P}(Y_1 > 0) = \mathbb{P}(L > K_2)$ can be very small

CDO: An example



- ▶ The one-year loss probability of senior (AAA-rated) tranches is **less than 1/10,000**
- ▶ **Some** investors are happy to hold a **speculative grade bond**, while others seek **safer bonds**.

Dependence modeling and risk aggregation

The rating for CDO tranches involves calculating $\mathbb{P}(L > K)$, where

- ▶ $L = \sum_{i=1}^n X_i$, and X_i is the loss from a loan
- ▶ K is a constant and $K \gg \mathbb{E}[L]$
- ▶ n is **large**, and each X_i has a **small probability of loss** (default), i.e. $\mathbb{P}(X_i = 0) = 1 - \epsilon_i$ and ϵ_i is small
- ▶ ϵ_i is the default probability of loan i and it is **decisive in the calculation of the interest rate or price** for this loan
- ▶ ϵ_i is modelled “**relatively well**” using individual credit characteristics

Dependence modeling and risk aggregation

- ▶ How X_1, \dots, X_n are dependent is **unknown** and they are almost “**uncorrelated**” because they were **diversified by region**
- ▶ If X_1, \dots, X_n are almost independent, then the **central limit theorem** can be applied, and $\mathbb{P}(L > K)$ can be approximated
- ▶ The **dependence structure** of (X_1, \dots, X_n) matters:
 - Assume $\mathbb{P}(X_i = 1) = 0.1$, $\mathbb{P}(X_i = 0) = 0.9$, $n = 1000$, $K = 200$
 - If X_1, \dots, X_n are iid, then $\mathbb{P}(L > K) < 10^{-20}$
 - If X_1, \dots, X_n are positively dependent, then $\mathbb{P}(L > K) \approx 0.1$
 - $\sup\{\mathbb{P}(L > K) : \text{all dependence structures}\} = ?$

Financial crisis

- ▶ Classic statistics **fails to apply** here: **no data are available** for the scenario “house prices started to fall”
- ▶ **The past data** (the scenario “house prices are good”) suggests that X_1, \dots, X_n are **mildly correlated or almost independent**
- ▶ Substantial miscalculation of $\mathbb{P}(L > K)$ leads to **unjustified high rating** of CDO products \Rightarrow **huge model risk**
- ▶ In 2007, the mortgage backed securities turned out to be **highly correlated**
- ▶ **CDOs made up over half (\$542 billion)** of the nearly trillion dollars in losses suffered by financial institutions from 2007 to early 2009

Risk assessment under uncertainty

Abstract setup.


- ▶ A vector of **risk factors**: $\mathbf{X} = (X_1, \dots, X_n)$
- ▶ A financial position $\Psi(\mathbf{X})$
- ▶ A mapping $\rho : \mathbf{X} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ (a measure of risk)

Key task: Calculate $\rho(\Psi(\mathbf{X}))$

Most practical choices:

- ▶ $\Psi(\mathbf{X}) = \sum_{i=1}^n X_i$
- ▶ $\rho(X) = \mathbb{P}(X > t)$, $\rho = \text{VaR}_p$ or $\rho = \text{ES}_p$

Risk assessment under uncertainty



Value-at-Risk (VaR), $p \in (0, 1)$

$$\text{VaR}_p : L^0 \rightarrow \mathbb{R},$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{VaR}_p(X) &= q_p(X) \\ &= \inf\{x \in \mathbb{R} : \mathbb{P}(X \leq x) \geq p\} \end{aligned}$$

(left-quantile)

Expected Shortfall (ES), $p \in (0, 1)$

$$\text{ES}_p : L^1 \rightarrow \mathbb{R},$$

$$\text{ES}_p(X) = \frac{1}{1-p} \int_p^1 \text{VaR}_q(X) dq$$

(also: TVaR/CVaR/AVaR/CTE)

Risk assessment under uncertainty

- ▶ Because ES is **subadditive**, with unknown dependence

$$\text{ES}_p \left(\sum_{i=1}^n X_i \right) \leq \sum_{i=1}^n \text{ES}_p(X_i)$$

- ▶ Marginal information provides bounds on the portfolio
- ▶ Worst-case ES: $\overline{\text{ES}}_p = \sum_{i=1}^n \text{ES}_p(X_i)$
- ▶ VaR: **not subadditive**
- ▶ Worst-case VaR: generally an open question for $n \geq 3$
- ▶ Similarly: bounds on $\mathbb{P}(\sum_{i=1}^n X_i > t)$

W.-Peng-Yang, [Bounds for the sum of dependent risks and worst Value-at-Risk with monotone marginal densities](#). Finance and Stochastics, 2013

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Equilibria

- ▶ n agents each with a preference
- ▶ **Competitive** equilibrium
 - Each agent i chooses a decision X_i according to some optimization of his/her own preference and constraints
 - Equilibrium: A random vector (X_1, \dots, X_n) such that no agent would be able to change positions to improve
- ▶ Cooperative (**Pareto**) equilibrium
 - A central planner chooses (X_1, \dots, X_n)
 - Equilibrium: A random vector (X_1, \dots, X_n) that cannot be strictly improved

Welfare theorems

Under some conditions, competitive equilibrium \iff cooperative equilibrium

Positive and negative dependence

Random variables X_1, \dots, X_n

▶ **Positive** dependence

- Random variables roughly move in the same direction
- If one of them is large, then others are likely to be large
- Example: X_1, \dots, X_n are all proportional to each other

▶ **Independence**

▶ **Negative** dependence

- Random variables roughly move in the opposite direction
- If one of them is large, then others are likely to be small
- Example: $(X_1, \dots, X_n) \sim \text{Multinomial}$
- Very difficult to analyze if $n \geq 3$

Risk sharing games

Risk sharing, risk exchange, and market equilibria

$$X \mapsto (X_1, \dots, X_n) \text{ s.t. } \sum_{i=1}^n X_i = X$$


“Canonical form” of an equilibrium allocation?

- ▶ proportional: $X_i = a_i X$ for some $\sum_{i=1}^n a_i = 1$?
- ▶ lottery: $X_i = \mathbb{1}_{A_i} X$ for some $\bigcup_{i=1}^n A_i = \Omega$?
- ▶ other forms?



Quantile-based risk sharing

utility-based $\max \sum_{i=1}^n \lambda_i \mathbb{E}[u_i(X_i)]$	quantile-based $\min \sum_{i=1}^n \lambda_i \text{VaR}_{\alpha_i}(X_i)$
horizontally cut $(X/n, \dots, X/n)$	vertically cut $(X\mathbb{1}_{A_1}, \dots, X\mathbb{1}_{A_n})$
coinsurance	roulette
positive dependence	negative dependence



Theorem


For mixed VaR, ES, and “other similar” agents, an equilibrium allocation is extremally negatively dependent.

[Embrechts-Liu-W.](#), [Quantile-based risk sharing](#).

Operations Research, 2018, Theorems 1 - 3


Colonel Blotto games

Colonel Blotto games (all-pay auctions)



- ▶ Two players
- ▶ $X_1 + \dots + X_n = x$
- ▶ $Y_1 + \dots + Y_n = y$
- ▶ Goal: **maximize**

$$\sum_{i=1}^n \mathbb{E}[f_i(X_i, Y_i)]$$
 e.g. $f_i(s, t) = v_i \mathbb{1}_{\{s > t\}}$
- ▶ **Nash equilibrium**



- ▶ solve for marginals $X_1 \sim F_1, \dots, X_n \sim F_n$


Approach: ▶ find dependence (if possible) s.t. $X_1 + \dots + X_n = x$
 ▶ \Rightarrow Extremal negative dependence (**joint mixability**)

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Axiomatic characterization of ES

Theorem

A risk measure penalizes **risk concentration** (a special form of positive dependence) if and only if it is an ES.



- ▶ ES is the most important risk measure in banking regulation (**Basel FRTB**)
- ▶ The first axiomatic characterization of ES (introduced ~ 2000)

W.-Zitikis, [An axiomatic foundation for the Expected Shortfall](#).

Management Science, 2021, Theorem 1

Axiomatic characterization of ES

Axioms

- M.** (**Monotonicity**) A surely larger or equal loss leads to a larger or equal risk value, that is, $\rho(X) \leq \rho(Y)$ whenever $X \leq Y$.
- LI.** (**Law-invariance**) The risk value depends on the loss via its distribution, that is, $\rho(X) = \rho(Y)$ whenever $X \stackrel{d}{=} Y$.
- P.** (**Prudence**) The risk value is not underestimated by approximations, that is, $\limsup_n \rho(\xi_n) \geq \rho(X)$ whenever $\xi_n \rightarrow X$ point-wise.
- NRC.** (**No reward for concentration**) There exists an event $A \in \mathcal{F}$ such that $\rho(X + Y) = \rho(X) + \rho(Y)$ holds for all risks X and Y sharing the tail event A .

Definition (Tail events)

A **tail event** of X is $A \in \mathcal{F}$ such that

- $0 < \mathbb{P}(A) < 1$
- $X(\omega) \geq X(\omega')$
for a.s. all $\omega \in A$ and $\omega' \in A^c$

Theorem

A functional $\rho : L^1 \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ with $\rho(1) = 1$ satisfies Axioms **M**, **LI**, **P** and **NRC** if and only if $\rho = \text{ES}_p$ for some $p \in (0, 1)$.

Equivalence between risk and dependence

Theorem

Risk aversion (**Rothschild-Stiglitz**) \iff dependence aversion

Theorem

A mapping $\rho : \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ is dependence neutral, i.e., $\rho(X + Y)$ depends only on the marginal distributions of $(X, Y) \in \mathcal{X}^2$, if and only if $\rho = f \circ \mathbb{E}$ on \mathcal{X} for some $f : \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$.



W.-Wu, [Dependence and risk attitudes: An equivalence.](#)

SSRN: 3707709, 2020, Theorems 1 - 2 and Proposition 3

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Transport theory

- ▶ Pure mathematics
- ▶ Important applications
 - economics
 - decision theory
 - finance
 - engineering
 - operations research
 - physics
- ▶ 1 Nobel Prize laureate
- ▶ 2 Fields medalists



Monge's formulation

- ▶ A and B are two Radon spaces (main example: \mathbb{R}^d)
- ▶ **Cost function** $c : A \times B \rightarrow [0, \infty]$ or $(-\infty, \infty]$
- ▶ Given probability measures μ on A and ν on B
- ▶ **Monge's problem**: find a transport map $T : A \rightarrow B$ that attains

$$\inf \left\{ \int_A c(x, T(x)) d\mu(x) \mid T_*(\mu) = \nu \right\},$$

where $T_*(\mu)$ is the push forward of μ by T


Monge's formulation



Gaspard Monge
1746-1818

$$d\mu(\mathbf{x}) = I_0(\mathbf{x})d\mathbf{x}$$

$$d\nu(\mathbf{x}) = I_1(\mathbf{x})d\mathbf{x}$$



Le mémoire sur les déblais et les remblais
(The note on land excavation and infill)

Kantorovich's formulation

- ▶ Monge's formulation may be ill-posed (e.g., point masses)
- ▶ **Kantorovich's problem**: find a probability measure P on $A \times B$ that attains

$$\inf \left\{ \int_{A \times B} c(x, y) dP(x, y) \mid P \in \Gamma(\mu, \nu) \right\},$$


where $\Gamma(\mu, \nu)$ is the set of probability measures on $A \times B$ with marginals μ and ν .

- ▶ $A \times B = \mathbb{R} \times \mathbb{R}$: copulas and dependence
- ▶ Discrete version: linear programming

Kantorovich's formulation



Leonid Kantorovich
1912-1986




Resource allocation

Scheduling

$$\begin{aligned} & \text{Minimize } \max(\Psi(\mathbf{X})) \\ & \text{Minimize } \text{Var}(\Psi(\mathbf{X})) \\ \text{s.t. } & X_i \sim F_i, i = 1, \dots, n \end{aligned}$$

(an **NP-hard** problem)



$$\begin{bmatrix} 44 & 10 & 24 \\ 66 & 32 & 37 \\ 67 & 48 & 41 \\ 71 & 57 & 43 \\ 87 & 60 & 83 \end{bmatrix} \begin{matrix} 78 \\ 135 \\ 156 \\ 171 \\ 230 \end{matrix} \implies \begin{bmatrix} 87 & 10 & 43 \\ 71 & 60 & 24 \\ 67 & 48 & 41 \\ 44 & 32 & 83 \\ 66 & 57 & 37 \end{bmatrix} \begin{matrix} 140 \\ 155 \\ 156 \\ 159 \\ 160 \end{matrix}$$

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Treatment effect analysis

score X (control)

score Y (experimental)

▶ Marginals of (X, Y) : ✓

▶ Effect measurement



$\mathbb{E}[Y - X]$: ✓

▶ $\text{Var}(Y - X)$: (?)

▶ Dependence of (X, Y) :

unidentifiable

(Neyman'23)



Meta analysis

- ▶ A (large) set of p-values is only **one vector**: little hope to test/verify the dependence model
- ▶ **Efron'10**, **Large-scale Inference**, p50-p51:
"independence among the p-values ... usually an unrealistic assumption. ... even PRD [positive regression dependence] is unlikely to hold in practice."
- ▶ Need procedures which work on **arbitrarily dependent** p-values
- ▶ **Complicated/strange dependence** arises when tests statistics are generated by some **adaptive procedure**
 - selective inference
 - multi-armed bandit problems

Merging p-values in multiple hypothesis testing

- ▶ P_1, \dots, P_K : p-values (satisfying $\mathbb{P}(P_k \leq \epsilon) \leq \epsilon$)
- ▶ **arbitrarily dependent**
- ▶ P-merging function F :
 $\mathbb{P}(F(P_1, \dots, P_K) \leq \epsilon) \leq \epsilon$ for all (P_1, \dots, P_K) and ϵ
- ▶ Find $a_{r,K}$ such that $a_{r,K} M_{r,K}$ is a p-merging function
 - Generalized average $M_{r,K}(\mathbf{p}) = \left(\frac{p_1^r + \dots + p_K^r}{K}\right)^{1/r}$

Theorem

$a_{1,K} = 2$ (arithmetic)

$a_{0,K} \sim e$ (geometric)

$a_{-1,K} \sim \log K$ (harmonic)

$a_{-\infty,K} = K$ (**Bonferroni**)

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P-hacking

Typical scientific research

- ▶ Group A tests a medication; gets “promising but not conclusive” results
- ▶ Group B continues with new data; even more promising
- ▶ Group C continues with new data ...
- ▶ Sweep all data together to recalculate p-value \Rightarrow **p-hacking**

What is an e-value?

- ▶ A hypothesis \mathcal{H} : a set of probability measures

Definition (e-values and p-values)

- (1) An **e-value** for testing \mathcal{H} is a non-negative extended random variable $E : \Omega \rightarrow [0, \infty]$ that satisfies $\sup_{H \in \mathcal{H}} \int E \, dH \leq 1$.
- (2) A **p-value** for testing \mathcal{H} is a random variable $P : \Omega \rightarrow [0, \infty)$ that satisfies $\sup_{H \in \mathcal{H}} H(P \leq \alpha) \leq \alpha$ for all $\alpha \in (0, 1)$.

- ▶ For simple hypothesis $\{\mathbb{P}\}$: non-negative E with mean ≤ 1
- ▶ **P-test**: $p(\text{data})$ small \implies reject
- ▶ **E-test**: $e(\text{data})$ large \implies reject

Vovk-W., [E-values: Calibration, combination, and applications](#).

Annals of Statistics, 2021

E-values, test supermartingales and betting scores

- ▶ A **test supermartingale**: a supermartingale $X = (X_t)$ (i.e., $\mathbb{E}[X_{t+1}|X_t] \leq X_t$) under the null with $X_0 = 1$
- ▶ **Optional** validity (**Doob's** optional stopping theorem):

X_τ is an e-value for any stopping time τ

- ▶ **Retrospective** validity (**Ville's** inequality):

$$\mathbb{P}\left(\sup_{t \geq 0} X_t \geq \frac{1}{\alpha}\right) \leq \alpha \implies \inf_{t \geq 0} X_t^{-1} \text{ is a p-value}$$

- ▶ **Bayes factors** and **likelihood ratios**:

$$e(\text{data}) = \frac{\Pr(\text{data} | \mathbb{Q})}{\Pr(\text{data} | \mathbb{P})}$$

- ▶ **Betting scores** (**Shafer-Vovk'19**, **Shafer'21**)

An analogy of p-values and e-values

	requirement	specific interpretation	representative forms	keyword
p-value P	$\mathbb{P}(P \leq \alpha) \leq \alpha$ for $\alpha \in (0, 1)$	probability of a more extreme observation	$\mathbb{P}(T' \leq T(\mathbf{X}) \mathbf{X})$	(conditional) probability
e-value E	$\mathbb{E}^{\mathbb{P}}[E] \leq 1$ and $E \geq 0$	likelihood ratios, stopped martingales, and betting scores	$\mathbb{E}^{\mathbb{P}} \left[\frac{d\mathbb{Q}}{d\mathbb{P}} \middle \mathbf{X} \right]$ $\mathbb{E}^{\mathbb{P}}[M_{\tau} \mathbf{X}]$	(conditional) expectation

An analogy of p-variables and e-variables for a simple hypothesis $\{\mathbb{P}\}$

- ▶ \mathbf{X} is data
- ▶ $T(\mathbf{X})$ is any test statistic
- ▶ T' is an independent copy of $T(\mathbf{X})$ under \mathbb{P}
- ▶ \mathbb{Q} is any probability measure
- ▶ M is a test supermartingale under \mathbb{P} and τ a stopping time

Advantages of e-values

- ▶ Validity for arbitrary dependence \Rightarrow expectation
- ▶ Validity for optional stopping times \Rightarrow martingale

E-values are a useful tool even if one is only interested in p-values

- ▶ Easy to combine
- ▶ Flexible to stop/continue (online testing; unfixed sample size)
- ▶ Non-asymptotic and often model-free

Vovk-Wang-W., [Admissible ways of merging p-values under arbitrary dependence.](#)

Annals of Statistics, 2021, Theorem 5.1

Example: Multi-armed bandit problems

- ▶ K arms
- ▶ H_k : arm k has mean reward at most 1
- ▶ Strategy (k_t) : at time t , pull arm k_t , get iid reward $X_{k_t,t} \geq 0$
 - optimized strategy
- ▶ Aim: quickly detect arms with mean > 1
 - or maximize profit, minimize regret, etc ...
- ▶ Running reward: $M_{k,t} = \prod_{j=1}^t X_{k,j} \mathbb{1}_{\{k_j=k\}}$
- ▶ Complicated dependence due to exploration/exploitation
- ▶ $M_{1,\tau}, \dots, M_{K,\tau}$ are e-values for any stopping time τ

Selective inference

Basic framework

- ▶ K hypotheses H_1, \dots, H_K
- ▶ $\mathcal{K} = \{1, \dots, K\}$
- ▶ H_k is null if $\mathbb{P} \in H_k$
- ▶ $\mathcal{N} \subseteq \mathcal{K}$: the set of (unknown) indices of null hypotheses
- ▶ $K_0 = |\mathcal{N}|$; if $K_0/K \approx 1$ then the signals are sparse

Examples

- ▶ Drug experiments; brain imaging; investment opportunities;
A/B tests; genome-wide association studies

Selective inference

For a testing procedure $\mathcal{D} : [0, 1]^K \rightarrow 2^{\mathcal{K}}$ or $[0, \infty]^K \rightarrow 2^{\mathcal{K}}$:

- ▶ $R_{\mathcal{D}}$: number of **total discoveries** ($R_{\mathcal{D}} = |\mathcal{D}|$)
- ▶ $F_{\mathcal{D}}$: number of **false discoveries** ($F_{\mathcal{D}} = |\mathcal{D} \cap \mathcal{N}|$)
- ▶ False discovery proportion (FDP): $F_{\mathcal{D}}/R_{\mathcal{D}}$ with $0/0 = 0$
- ▶ **Benjamini-Hochberg'95**: control the FDR $\mathbb{E}[F_{\mathcal{D}}/R_{\mathcal{D}}] \leq \alpha$

BH procedure

BH procedure

The **Benjamini-Hochberg (BH) procedure** $\mathcal{D}(\alpha)$ rejects hypotheses with the smallest k^* p-values, where

$$k^* = \max \left\{ k \in \mathcal{K} : \frac{K p_{(k)}}{k} \leq \alpha \right\}.$$

	FDR	dependence
BH'95	$\frac{K_0}{K} \alpha$	independence
BY'01	$\frac{K_0}{K} \alpha$	PRDS
BY'01	$\ell_K \frac{K_0}{K} \alpha$	arbitrary

$\ell_K = \sum_{j=1}^K j^{-1} \approx \log K$. PRDS: **positive regression dependence on a subset**, e.g., jointly Gaussian test statistics with correlations ≥ 0

E-BH procedure

- ▶ $e_{[1]} \geq \dots \geq e_{[K]}$: order statistics of **arbitrary** e-values

E-BH procedure

The **e-BH procedure** $\mathcal{G}(\alpha) : [0, \infty]^K \rightarrow 2^{\mathcal{K}}$ for $\alpha > 0$ rejects hypotheses with the largest k^* e-values, where

$$k^* = \max \left\{ k \in \mathcal{K} : \frac{ke_{[k]}}{K} \geq \frac{1}{\alpha} \right\}.$$

Theorem

The e-BH procedure always has FDR at most $K_0\alpha/K$.

W.-Ramdas, [False discovery rate control with e-values](#).

arXiv: 2009.02824, 2020, Theorem 5.1

Combination and multiple testing

	arbitrarily dependent	optimality	sequential/independent	optimality
p-values P_1, \dots, P_K	Bonferroni robust averaging many others	NO	Fisher Simes many others	NO
e-values E_1, \dots, E_K	arithmetic mean	YES	product martingale merging	weakly NO

	FDR	dependence
BH procedure	$\frac{K_0}{K} \alpha$	independence/PRDS
BY procedure	$\ell_K \frac{K_0}{K} \alpha$	arbitrary
e-BH procedure	$\frac{K_0}{K} \alpha$	arbitrary

FDR procedures ($K_0 = \#\text{nulls}$, $K = \#\text{hypotheses}$, $\ell_K = \sum_{k=1}^K k^{-1} \approx \log K$)

Thank you

Thank you for your attention!

A multi-armed bandit problem

Problem setting

- ▶ K arms each with a reward $X^k \geq 0$
- ▶ Pulling arm k produces an iid sample (X_1^k, X_2^k, \dots) from X^k
- ▶ Null hypotheses: $\mathbb{E}[X_k] \leq 1, k \in \mathcal{K}$
- ▶ Arms have to be pulled **in order** and previous arms cannot be revisited
- ▶ An arm can be pulled at most n times (budget)
- ▶ Goal: detect non-null arms as quickly as possible
- ▶ Example: investment opportunities; medical experiment

A multi-armed bandit problem

The e-value $e_{k,j}$ and the p-value $p_{k,j}$ are realized by, respectively,

$$E_{k,j} := \prod_{i=1}^j X_i^k \quad \text{and} \quad P_{k,j} := \left(\max_{i=1,\dots,j} E_{k,i} \right)^{-1} \quad (p \leq 1/e)$$

Algorithm

- ▶ Select a p- or e-testing procedure \mathcal{D} and start with $\mathbf{e} = \mathbf{p} = \mathbf{1}$
- ▶ For arm k , stop at T_k such that either \mathcal{D} produces a new discovery or $T_k = n$
- ▶ Update e-values or p-values and move to arm $k + 1$

The final e-variables E_k and p-variables P_k are obtained by

$$E_k = E_{k,T_k} \quad \text{and} \quad P_k = P_{k,T_k}, \quad k = 1, \dots, K.$$

A multi-armed bandit problem

Table: Conditions for the validity of the testing algorithm

	AD data across arms	AD stopping rules T_k	FDR guarantee in our experiments
e-BH	YES	YES	valid at level $\alpha K_0/K$
BH	NO	NO	not valid
BY	YES	YES	valid at level $\alpha K_0/K$
cBH	NO	YES	valid at level $\alpha K_0/K$

Consider BH, e-BH, BY and compliant BH (cBH) procedures

- ▶ BY: $\mathcal{D}(\alpha_1)$ where $\alpha_1 \ell_K = \alpha$ (**Benjamini-Yekutieli'01**)
- ▶ cBH: $\mathcal{D}(\alpha_2)$ where $\alpha_2(1 + \log(1/\alpha_2)) = \alpha$ (**Su'18**)

A multi-armed bandit problem

Data generating process

- ▶ More promising arms come first: arm k is non-null with probability $\theta(K - k + 1)/(K + 1)$, $\theta \in [0, 1]$
- ▶ The expected number of non-nulls in this setting is $\theta/2$
- ▶ $s_k \sim \text{Expo}(\mu)$ is the strength of signal for arm k
- ▶ Conditional on s_k ,

$$X_1^k, \dots, X_n^k \stackrel{\text{iid}}{\sim} X^k = \exp\left(Z^k + s_k \mathbf{1}_{\{k \in K \setminus \mathcal{W}\}} - 1/2\right)$$

where Z^1, \dots, Z^K are iid standard normal.

- ▶ Set $\alpha = 0.05$ and $\theta = 0.5$

A multi-armed bandit problem

Table: $R = \#\{\text{rejected hypothesis}\}$, $B\% = \%\{\text{unused budget}\}$, $TD = \#\{\text{true discoveries}\}$. Each number is computed over an average of 500 trials. Default values: $K = 500$, $n = 50$ and $\mu = 1$.

	(a) Default				(b) $K = 2000$				(c) $n = 10$			
	R	$B\%$	TD	FDP%	R	$B\%$	TD	FDP%	R	$B\%$	TD	FDP%
e-BH	74.4	11.42	73.2	1.58	297.6	11.39	293.2	1.48	47.7	3.99	47.3	0.83
BH	77.0	11.44	75.3	2.13	307.8	11.41	301.4	2.07	49.3	4.01	48.7	1.06
BY	70.6	10.06	70.4	0.31	281.2	9.95	280.4	0.26	38.4	2.77	38.4	0.08
cBH	71.1	10.16	70.8	0.36	284.5	10.15	283.5	0.36	39.2	2.85	39.2	0.11

	(d) $n = 100$				(e) $\mu = 0.5$				(f) $\mu = 2$			
	R	$B\%$	TD	FDP%	R	$B\%$	TD	FDP%	R	$B\%$	TD	FDP%
e-BH	79.1	13.48	77.9	1.50	43.5	5.77	42.9	1.54	97.4	16.46	95.9	1.54
BH	81.3	13.50	79.5	2.13	46.3	5.80	45.3	2.13	99.3	16.47	97.2	2.07
BY	76.4	12.36	76.1	0.35	39.6	4.66	39.5	0.27	94.3	15.23	94.1	0.29
cBH	76.7	12.44	76.4	0.41	40.1	4.74	40.0	0.35	94.6	15.32	94.3	0.35

Calibration and combination

- ▶ Admissible p-to-e calibrators
 - Power calibrators: $f_{\kappa}(p) = \kappa p^{\kappa-1}$ for $\kappa \in (0, 1)$
 - Shafer's: $f(p) = p^{-1/2} - 1$
 - Averaging f_{κ} : $\int_0^1 \kappa p^{\kappa-1} d\kappa = \frac{1-p+p \ln p}{p(-\ln p)^2}$
- ▶ The only admissible e-to-p calibrator: $e \rightarrow (1/e) \wedge 1$
- ▶ Very roughly: $p \sim 1/e$

E-merging functions

E-merging functions

- ▶ arithmetic average M_K : arbitrary dependence
- ▶ product P_K : independence

Theorem 1

Suppose that F is a symmetric e-merging function. Then $F \leq \lambda + (1 - \lambda)M_K$ for some $\lambda \in [0, 1]$, and F is admissible if and only if $F = \lambda + (1 - \lambda)M_K$ with $\lambda = F(\mathbf{0})$.

Vovk-W., [E-values: Calibration, combination, and applications.](#)

Annals of Statistics, 2021, Theorem 3.2

Connection to p-merging

Theorem 2

For any *admissible* p-merging function F and $\epsilon \in (0, 1)$, there exist $(\lambda_1, \dots, \lambda_K) \in \Delta_K$ (standard simplex) and *admissible calibrators* f_1, \dots, f_K s.t.

$$F(\mathbf{p}) \leq \epsilon \iff \sum_{k=1}^K \lambda_k f_k(p_k) \geq \frac{1}{\epsilon}.$$

If F is *symmetric*, then there exists an *admissible calibrator* f s.t.

$$F(\mathbf{p}) \leq \epsilon \iff \frac{1}{K} \sum_{k=1}^K f(p_k) \geq \frac{1}{\epsilon}.$$

Vovk-Wang-W., *Admissible ways of merging p-values under arbitrary dependence*.

Annals of Statistics, 2021, Theorem 5.1

Compliant procedures

An e-testing procedure \mathcal{G} is said to be **compliant at level $\alpha \in (0, 1)$** if every rejected e-value e_k satisfies

$$e_k \geq \frac{K}{\alpha R_{\mathcal{G}}}.$$

- ▶ The base e-BH procedure is compliant and it dominates all other compliant procedures

Compliant procedures

Proposition 1

Any compliant e-testing procedure at level α has FDR at most $\alpha K_0/K$ for arbitrary configurations of e-values.

Proof. Let \mathcal{G} be a compliant e-testing procedure. The FDP of \mathcal{G} satisfies

$$\frac{F_{\mathcal{G}}}{R_{\mathcal{G}} \vee 1} = \frac{|\mathcal{G}(\mathbf{E}) \cap \mathcal{N}|}{R_{\mathcal{G}} \vee 1} = \sum_{k \in \mathcal{N}} \frac{\mathbb{1}_{\{k \in \mathcal{G}(\mathbf{E})\}}}{R_{\mathcal{G}} \vee 1} \leq \sum_{k \in \mathcal{N}} \frac{\mathbb{1}_{\{k \in \mathcal{G}(\mathbf{E})\}} \alpha E_k}{K} \leq \sum_{k \in \mathcal{N}} \frac{\alpha E_k}{K},$$

where the first inequality is due to compliance. As $\mathbb{E}[E_k] \leq 1$ for $k \in \mathcal{N}$, we have

$$\mathbb{E} \left[\frac{F_{\mathcal{G}}}{R_{\mathcal{G}}} \right] \leq \sum_{k \in \mathcal{N}} \mathbb{E} \left[\frac{\alpha E_k}{K} \right] \leq \frac{\alpha K_0}{K}.$$

Compliant procedures

- ▶ General compliant p-testing procedures do not have this property even if p-values are independent
- ▶ For independent p-values, a compliant p-testing procedure at α has a weaker FDR guarantee $\alpha(1 + \log(1/\alpha)) > \alpha$ (Su'18)

Compliance is useful in

- ▶ data-driven structured settings
- ▶ post-selection testing
- ▶ group testing
- ▶ multi-armed bandit problems

Boosting

For each $k \in \mathcal{K}$, take a **boosting factor** $b_k \geq 1$ such that

$$\max_{x \in K/\mathcal{K}} x \mathbb{P}(\alpha b_k E_k \geq x) \leq \alpha \quad \text{if e-values are PRDS}$$

$$\mathbb{E}[T(\alpha b_k E_k)] \leq \alpha \quad \text{otherwise (AD)}$$

and let $e'_k = b_k e_k$.

- ▶ \mathbb{E} and \mathbb{P} are computed under the null distribution of E_k
- ▶ Composite null: require for all probability measures in H_k
- ▶ $b_k = 1$ is always valid
- ▶ Non-linear boosting is also possible
- ▶ e' may not have the same order as e .

E-BH procedure

Example.

- ▶ For $\lambda \in (0, 1)$

$$E_k = \lambda P_k^{\lambda-1},$$

where P_k is standard uniform if $k \in \mathcal{N}$

- ▶ $y_\alpha \leq (\lambda^\lambda \alpha)^{1/(1-\lambda)}$
- ▶ $\lambda = 1/2 \implies y_\alpha \leq \alpha^2/2$
- ▶ $\alpha = 0.05, \lambda = 1/2$
 - $b_k \approx 6.32$ (AD)
 - $b_k \approx 8.94$ (PRDS)

E-BH procedure

Example.

- ▶ For $\delta > 0$,

$$E_k = e^{\delta X_k - \delta^2/2},$$

where X_k is standard normal if $k \in \mathcal{N}$

- ▶ $\alpha = 0.05$, $\delta = 3$
 - $b \approx 1.37$ (AD)
 - $b \approx 7.88$ (PRDS)

Correlated z-tests

- ▶ $X_k \sim N(0, 1)$ if $k \in \mathcal{N}$
- ▶ $X_k \sim N(\delta, 1)$ if $k \notin \mathcal{N}$, $\delta < 0$
- ▶ X_1, \dots, X_K are jointly Gaussian
- ▶ E-values from likelihood ratios

$$E_k = \exp(\delta X_k - \delta^2/2)$$

- ▶ P-values from Neyman-Pearson tests

$$P_k = \Phi(X_k)$$

- ▶ Set $\delta = -3$

Correlated z-tests

Table: Simulation results for correlated z-tests, where $\rho_{i,j}$ is the correlation between two test statistics X_i and X_j for $i \neq j$. Each cell gives the number of rejections and, in parentheses, the realized FDP (in %). Each number is computed over an average of 1,000 trials.

(a) Independent and positively correlated tests, $K = 1000$, $K_0 = 800$

	$\rho_{ij} = 0$			$\rho_{ij} = 0.5$		
	$\alpha = 10\%$	$\alpha = 5\%$	$\alpha = 2\%$	$\alpha = 10\%$	$\alpha = 5\%$	$\alpha = 2\%$
BH	177.3 (8.01)	148.7 (4.07)	115.0 (1.63)	180.0 (7.00)	144.8 (3.64)	109.8 (1.50)
e-BH PRDS	171.8 (7.07)	147.6 (3.95)	114.6 (1.62)	170.2 (5.71)	142.5 (3.35)	108.0 (1.50)
BY	101.1 (1.10)	78.8 (0.57)	53.2 (0.22)	96.6 (1.03)	76.7 (0.50)	55.0 (0.20)
e-BH AD	109.4 (1.41)	85.4 (0.68)	54.6 (0.24)	103.1 (1.32)	81.4 (0.70)	56.6 (0.28)
base e-BH	97.5 (1.00)	70.6 (0.43)	36.9 (0.11)	91.9 (0.97)	69.1 (0.45)	43.6 (0.16)

Correlated z-tests

(b) Independent tests with large number of hypotheses

	$K = 20,000, K_0 = 10,000$			$K = 20,000, K_0 = 19,000$		
	$\alpha = 10\%$	$\alpha = 5\%$	$\alpha = 2\%$	$\alpha = 10\%$	$\alpha = 5\%$	$\alpha = 2\%$
BH	9567 (5.00)	8564 (2.49)	7164 (1.00)	681.3 (9.58)	520.2 (4.79)	357.7 (1.93)
e-BH PRDS	9092 (3.60)	8330 (2.13)	7124 (0.98)	681.3 (9.58)	509.3 (4.54)	312.1 (1.40)
BY	5956 (0.48)	4818 (0.24)	3417 (0.10)	254.1 (0.89)	177.6 (0.46)	103.1 (0.19)
e-BH AD	6811 (0.80)	5809 (0.44)	4384 (0.18)	271.0 (1.02)	159.5 (0.39)	51.4 (0.07)
base e-BH	6426 (0.64)	5234 (0.31)	3509 (0.10)	224.8 (0.69)	109.2 (0.21)	16.4 (0.01)

(c) Negatively correlated tests, $K = 1000, K_0 = 800$.

	$\rho_{ij} = -1/(K - 1)$			$\rho_{ij} = -0.5\mathbb{1}_{\{ i-j =1\}}$		
	$\alpha = 10\%$	$\alpha = 5\%$	$\alpha = 2\%$	$\alpha = 10\%$	$\alpha = 5\%$	$\alpha = 2\%$
BH	177.7 (8.14)	149.0 (4.09)	115.2 (1.61)	177.2 (8.10)	148.8 (4.00)	115.3 (1.62)
e-BH PRDS	172.0 (7.13)	147.9 (3.98)	114.9 (1.59)	171.5 (7.13)	147.7 (3.89)	114.9 (1.61)
BY	101.2 (1.08)	78.8 (0.52)	53.3 (0.20)	101.3 (1.11)	78.8 (0.56)	53.2 (0.22)
e-BH AD	109.7 (1.38)	85.5 (0.65)	54.6 (0.22)	109.8 (1.40)	85.6 (0.69)	54.6 (0.24)
base e-BH	97.8 (0.98)	70.7 (0.40)	37.2 (0.11)	97.6 (0.99)	70.7 (0.41)	36.7 (0.12)